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or simply unavailable in many cases.70 Thus, given the number
of instances where the production-interchangeability defense has
been rejected," a court generally unsympathetic to this type of
analysis may find it relatively easy to limit Budd to its particular
facts.
Hopefully, this will not be the case. Led by a "new antitrust
majority," 72 the Supreme Court appears to be creating a new
climate in antitrust law, one more favorable to mergers than in
the past. 3 Since one of the major means of blocking mergers
was the use of extremely flexible- and at times question-
able 1 - market definitions, change, if in store, will likely come
in this area. If this development takes place, Budd, in addition
to providing a practical and realistic rule for evaluating toehold
acquisitions, should prove an important example of sensible ap-
plication of economic analysis in defining markets.
Labor Law - ARBITRATION - DUTY TO ARBITRATE SEVERANCE
PAY SURVIVES TERMINATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREE-
MENT BEFORE CLOSING OF PLANT - Local 358, Bakery & Con-
fectionary Workers v. Nolde Brothers, Inc., 78 Lab. Cas. 1 11,221
(4th Cir. Oct. 23, 1975).
On July 28, 1970, the Bakery Workers and Nolde Brothers
entered into a collective bargaining agreement covering em-
ployees at the company's Norfolk, Virginia bakery. The agree-
ment was to remain in effect until July 21, 1973 and thereafter
until a new agreement was reached or until either party gave
seven days' notice of termination.' It included a broad arbi-
tration clause, a no-strike clause, and a provision for severance
pay, upon the permanent closing of the bakery, for each em-
ployee who had worked full-time for at least three years imme-
7 0 See note 48 supra.
71 See p. 809 & notes 56, 59 & 6o supra.
72 See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 48 U.S. 602, 642 (1974)
(White, J., dissenting).
73 One commentator has suggested that the Court's past hostility to mergers
may have been an attempt to atone f6r earlier "sins" of undue tolerance of
mergers. P. AREEDA, supra note 26, at 696.
14 This branch of the Court's jurisprudence was described as the "nadir of its
judicial performances," Handler, supra note 24, at 455. See generally id. at 455
n.229 (collecting commentary critical of the Court); Schlade, supra note 24, at
400-02.
'Local 358, Bakery & Confectionary Workers v. Nolde Bros., 382 F. Supp.
1354, 1355-56 (E.D. Va. 7974).
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diately prior to his layoff due to the closing.' After several months
of negotiations, the union on August 21, 1973 gave notice of its
intent to terminate the agreement. On August 31, 1973, the
union threatened to strike, whereupon the company immediately
shut down the bakery. After the company refused to give sever-
ance pay or to arbitrate whether it had a duty to do so, the union
sued in federal district court under section 301 (a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act.3 The district court held that the
union had no contractual entitlement to severance pay because it
had voluntarily terminated the agreement prior to the bakery
closing.' The court further stated that the company had no duty
to arbitrate the dispute, since it had arisen after expiration of
the agreement.5
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and
instructed the district court to order the company to enter into
arbitration. Writing for the court, Judge Craven declared that
the district court should not have proceeded to the merits of the
underlying dispute. He stated that whether the parties "chose
[to] agree to the accrual of rights during the term of an agree-
ment and their realization after the agreement had expired" I
was a matter of contract interpretation that should only be con-
sidered by the arbitrator. Thus, the question the district court
should have considered was whether the employer had a duty to
arbitrate the severance pay dispute after the agreement had ex-
pired.' Judge Craven found support in two Supreme Court de-
cisions, John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston 9 and Piano Workers
2 Local 358, Bakery & Confectionary Workers v. Nolde Bros., 78 Lab. Cas. ff
I1,22i at 2o,195 & nn.I, 2 (4 th Cir. Oct. 23, 1975).
3 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (,970).
4 382 F. Supp. at 1358.
5 Id. at 1359.
a 78 Lab. Cas. at 2o,196. Several courts have faced the issue in Nolde. In John
Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 555 (1964), the Supreme Court held that
a successor employer's obligation to arbitrate disputes concerning the collective
agreement of the predecessor employer included arbitration of a severance pay
dispute arising after expiration of the agreement. Subsequent federal court deci-
sions in cases not involving successor employers, however, are divided as to
whether the duty to arbitrate severance pay survives expiration of the collective
agreement. Compare United Steelworkers v. H.K. Porter Co., 64 L.R.R.M. 2201
(W.D. Pa. 1966) (duty to arbitrate did survive), with Milk Drivers Local 246
v. Thompson's Dairy, Inc., So L.R.R.M. 3403 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd mere., 489 F.2d
1272 (D.C. Cir. x974) (duty did not survive), and Ward Foods, Inc. v. Local 5o,
Bakery & Confectionary Workers, 36o F. Supp. 1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (same);
cf. Local 595, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Howe Sound Co., 35o F.2d 5o8
(3d Cir. i965) (duty to arbitrate holiday and vacation pay did survive).
' 78 Lab. Cas. at 20,196, quoting John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S.
543, 555 (1964).
8 78 Lab. Cas. at 20,196-97.
9376 U.S. 543 (1964).
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Local 2549 v. W.W. Kimball Co.,'° for his rejection of the em-
ployer's contention that the duty to arbitrate severance pay dis-
putes expired with the agreement. He asserted that a dispute
over whether the parties intended an accruable right such as
severance pay to survive the expiration of their agreement, unlike
a dispute involving a nonaccruable right," is subject to the arbi-
tration provision of the agreement even when the contingency
giving rise to the dispute occurs after expiration. 2
In a concurring and dissenting opinion," Judge Widener
argued that because it was not "clear beyond rational debate" "
that the litigants intended the dispute to be submitted to arbitra-
tion, the question of arbitrability, as well as the underlying dis-
pute, should be referred to the arbitrator. 5 The majority, he
thought, had sought to resolve conclusively whether the dispute
was arbitrable, thereby foreclosing further inquiry into this issue
by the arbitrator.' In a concurring opinion,1 Judge Aldrich
questioned the extent to which his colleagues were in disagree-
ment. He suggested that there are three issues involved every
time a union requests a court to order arbitration. The prelimi-
nary issue is whether either of the remaining issues should be
submitted for resolution by the arbitrator.' 8 The second issue is
whether the underlying grievance is in fact encompassed by the
arbitration provision. 9 The final issue involves the merits of the
underlying grievance.20
All three judges in Nolde agreed that the court should decide
the first issue- whether anything should be submitted to arbi-
tration.2' They also agreed that the arbitrator should decide the
third issue -the merits of the underlying dispute.22 The pos-
sible disagreement within the Nolde court concerned who should
10379 U.S. 357, rev'g Mer. 333 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'g 221 F. Supp.
461 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (reinstatement of district court's order that dispute involving
seniority rights of laid off employees be arbitrated even though layoffs did not
occur until after expiration of bargaining agreement).
' 78 Lab. Cas. at 20,199.
1d. at 20,198.
Id. at 20,200 (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting).
'4 Id. at 20,201 (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting).
15 Id. at 20,202 (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting).
1d.
1 Id. at 20,199 (Aldrich, J., concurring).
s Id. (Aldrich, J., concurring) (whether "there is no arbitrable issue at all").
0 Id. (Aldrich, 3., concurring) ("whether the issue of substance is one subject
to arbitration").
'o Id. (Aldrich, J., concurring) (whether there is an "issue of substance").
21See id. at 20,198; id. at 20,199 (Aldrich, J., concurring); id. at 20,202
(Widener, 3., concurring and dissenting).
2See id. at 20,196; id. at 20,199 (Aldrich, J., concurring); id. at 20,202
(Widener, J., concurring and dissenting).
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decide the second issue. Judge Widener believed that, at least
in this case,22 the second issue - whether the grievance is subject
to the arbitration clause - should also be decided by the arbitra-
tor. -4 Judge Craven replied that under "the general rule . . .
the initial question of arbitrability is . . . to be determined by
the court" and that an arbitrator may "only adjudge griev-
ances," 25 thus appearing to reject the contention that an arbitra-
tor may dismiss the grievance without reaching the merits. Judge
Aldrich, on the other hand, suggested that had the parties in
Nolde raised the second issue,2 he would have agreed with Judge
Widener that it should be reserved for the arbitrator.17
The ambiguity of Judge Craven's opinion lends itself to a
number of interpretations concerning what the character of the
union's claim or the inherent nature of the right to severance
pay had to be in order for the dispute to be arbitrable. He may
have believed that the union's mere claim that severance pay
rights vested was sufficient. A second interpretation is that the
nature of these rights had to be such that they could vest - that
is, they had to be accruable: susceptible to agreement by the
parties that they would accrue over the term of the contract.
Finally, he may have believed that a finding that severance pay
rights had indeed accrued under the contract was necessary for
a holding that the rights were arbitrable. None of these inter-
pretations presupposes a finding that the rights actually vested
and thus survived the expiration of the contract.
28
If expiration has any impact on whether an employer remains
bound by his promise to arbitrate, then in order for the court to
23 Judge Widener did not suggest that he believed the second issue raised by
Judge Aldrich should always be left open for determination by the arbitrator.
Rather, he thought that this was proper in Nolde because it was not clear the
parties intended disputes arising after expiration to be subject to arbitration and
because this issue was "inextricably intertwined" with the underlying dispute.
See id. at 20,201-02 (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting).
24 Id. at 20,202 (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting).
2 Id. at 20,198. Judge Craven said that "[ain exception to the rule is where a
clause in a labor contract purporting to exclude some matters from arbitration is
vague and ambiguous. In such a case, an arbitrator may be expressly empowered
to not only adjudge grievances but also to decide whether the instrument gives
him the power to do so." Id.
"s See id. at 20,199 (Aldrich, J., concurring) ("neither we, nor the arbitrator,
face the issue of arbitrabiity"). Neither party's brief argued that the arbitrator
should determine whether the severance pay grievance was indeed encompassed
by the arbitration provision.
2" See id. at 20,199-200 (Aldrich, J., concurring).
2SAccrued rights need not vest. Parties might intend that rights to certain
benefits accrue during the term of the agreement but that the rights expire when
the agreement expires.
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find a dispute arbitrable after expiration, 29 the union must allege
more than that under a provision of the expired agreement, em-
ployees are entitled to certain benefits; it must claim something
that transpired during the term of the agreement extends the
entitlement beyond expiration. The union in Nolde fulfilled this
requirement by arguing that the right to severance pay vested
during the term of the agreement. 0 Under the first interpretation
of Judge Craven's opinion, this allegation alone is sufficient for
a holding of arbitrability. 11
However, in distinguishing those post-expiration cases in
which disputes were held nonarbitrable, he suggested that the
bare union claim that rights had vested was not sufficient.
32
Under this second interpretation of his opinion, a finding by the
court that such rights could indeed have vested - that is, that
such rights were "accruable" 3 -was also necessary.34
A third interpretation of Judge Craven's opinion is that he
considered neither a mere claim of vesting nor a simple finding
2 While the duty to arbitrate must be based on a valid contract, see Gateway
Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 374 (1974); United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (ig6o), this duty may survive expiration of the
contract itself, see John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 554-55 (1964);
Smith & D. Jones, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration: The Emnerg-
ing Federal Law, 63 MicH. L. REv. 75I, 782-83 & n.77 (1964) (whether agreement
to arbitrate has expired is a matter solely for judicial determination, but court may
find that employer has obligation to arbitrate certain matters even after date of
contract expiration).
"0 Brief for Appellant at 16 n.3, 18-23.
"1 See 78 Lab. Cas. at 2o,196-97.
32 Id. at 20,X99 & n.7.
"2Judge Craven stated that the Nolde decision should not be read as dis-
approving the refusal to find "disputes involving nonaccruable rights" arbitrable.
Id. He specifically sought to distinguish Milk Drivers Local 246 v. Thompson's
Dairy, Inc., 80 L.R.R.M. 3403 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd men., 489 F.2d X272 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), in which a dispute over severance pay after expiration was held
nonarbitrable, by noting that in Milk Drivers the severance pay provision con-
tained a promise only to "negotiate" severance pay. Under such a provision,
"nothing could accrue." 78 Lab. Cas. at 20,199 n.7. It appears that the union in
Milk Drivers failed even to claim that rights had vested. See Brief for Appellant
at 17 n.4, Local 358, Bakery & Confectionary Workers v. Nolde Bros., 78 Lab. Cas.
ii 11,221 (4th Cir. 1975). Judge Craven did not rely on this; rather, he said that
in Milk Drivers "there was no room for an argument" that the parties had in-
tended severance pay rights to vest, 78 Lab. Cas. at 20J99 n.7, which suggests
that he thought that even if the union had made such a claim, it would not have
been sufficient for a holding of arbitrability.
"4 It is possible that in distinguishing between disputes involving "accruable"
rights and those involving "nonaccruable" rights, Judge Craven was merely cate-
gorizing previous post-expiration cases according to whether the party seeking
arbitration claimed that the disputed rights vested during the term of the agree-
ment. If this was all he intended, then his discussion of accruability is consistent
with the first interpretation of his opinion.
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by the court that such rights could have vested sufficient for a
holding of arbitrability. His statement that "only those rights
• . . that employees earn and that may or may not 'vest' " 1 are
arbitrable suggests that a court must find that the disputed rights
had actually accrued under the agreement. 6
Each of these views concerning the requirements for a hold-
ing of arbitrability implies a different division of responsibility
between the court and the arbitrator in resolving the three issues
raised in Judge Aldrich's opinion.3' The argument that the dis-
puted right must have accrued has some initial appeal, for if
Judge Craven intended to require a finding that the rights upon
which the grievance is based clearly arose during the term of
the agreement, Nolde would be analogous to previous cases that
found a duty to arbitrate because the events upon which the
grievance was based clearly occurred during the term of the
agreement.38 However, this argument ultimately fails. Although
its premise is that rights need not vest as they accrue, and that
whether the parties intended them to vest remains to be decided
by the arbitrator, the argument still requires consideration of
the inherent nature of the rights under dispute and thus im-
pinges upon the province of the arbitrator as sole interpreter of
the substantive terms of the agreement.39 On the one hand, if the
court finds that the union has failed to prove this element of its
case (i.e., that the rights had accrued), a grievance that the
arbitrator might have decided for the union 4 o will be prevented
from reaching arbitration. On the other hand, if the court sends
the grievance to the arbitrator because of its finding that the
i" 78 Lab. Cas. at 20,199. While the union equated earned rights and vested
rights, see id. at 20,196; Brief for Appellants at 19-20, the statement quoted in text
suggests that judge Craven did not accept this contention. Rather, he appears to
have implicitly equated "earn" with "accrue:" Id. at 20,199 & n.7; see note 28
supra.
"0 However, given judge Craven's criticism of the district court for making a
finding as to the inherent nature of severance pay, see id. at 20,196-97, it is
unlikely that he intended to base his holding of arbitrability on the "earned"
nature of the contested rights.
37 See p. 814 supra.
38 Compare Item Co. v. New Orleans Newspaper Guild, 256 F.2d 855 (5th
Cir.) (discharge occurring before contract expiration is arbitrable), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 867 (1958), with Procter & Gamble Ind. Union v. Procter & Gamble
Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1962) (arbitration not required where grievance
based on events occurring after term of agreement), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830
(1963).
29 See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
599 (ig6o).
4 °Arbitrators may well approach interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement differently than do courts. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (196o).
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contested rights had accrued, the arbitrator would still be pre-
cluded from considering the second issue raised by Judge Aldrich:
whether the contested rights in fact arose under the agreement
and therefore were subject to its arbitration provision."
If, however, Judge Craven intended only that the court must
find the contested rights accruable, that is, that the claim of
vesting is colorable,42 the effect of the court's holding is less
severe. Should the court determine that the disputed rights are
arguably subject to the arbitration provision of the agreement,
the arbitrator would be free to decide otherwise. But if the court
rejects the union's claim of accruability, it is still possible that
grievances the arbitrator might have decided for the union will
be prevented from reaching arbitration. This judicial determina-
tion of colorability seems to conflict with the Supreme Court's
admonition that "the courts . . . have no business weighing the
merits of the grievance . . . ,, '"
Under the first interpretation of Judge Craven's opinion -
that the union's claim of vesting was all that was required for a
holding of arbitrability - both the merits of the claim and the
4 Several commentators have suggested that the arbitrator is always free to
refuse to decide the merits of a grievance. See, e.g., E. Jones, The Name of the
Game is Decision: Some Reflections on "Arbitrability" and "Authority" in Labor
Arbitration, 46 TExAs L. REV. 865, 879-80 (1968); Aaron, Judicial Intervention
in Labor Arbitration, 20 STAN. L. REV. 41, 42-43 (1967). But see Communications
Workers v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 337 F.2d 455 (gth Cir. I964); Piano
Workers Local 2549 v. W.W. Kimball Co., 239 F. Supp. 523 (N.D. Ill. 1965) (on
remand). In practice, an arbitrator is bound by a court's holding that a given
dispute is arbitrable only if his award would be vacated or altered by an enforce-
ment court on the ground that he did not abide by the determinations made by
an earlier court in finding the dispute arbitrable. There exists little, if any, case
law on this issue, probably because an arbitrator who disagreed with a court's
determinations would not explicitly base his decision on this disagreement. Cf.
Smith & D. Jones, supra note 29, at 761, 787 (if arbitrator writes his opinion as
if deciding merits, legal and practical result does not depend upon whether arbi-
trator denies grievance on grounds of arbitrability or on the merits).
42 Assuming that accrual of severance pay rights during the term of the agree-
ment is a prerequisite for vesting of those rights before expiration, a finding that
the parties could have intended that the rights accrue, i.e., that the rights were
"accruable," would assure that the claim of vesting has potential merit, or is
"colorable."
4"United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (196o); see
Smith and D. Jones, supra note 29, at 785. But cf. John Wiley & Sons v. Living-
ston, 376 U.S. 543, 555 & n.8 (in finding rights to severance pay arbitrable even
after expiration, Court pointed out that there existed "possibility" that such rights
had accrued during agreement). It is not clear whether the Court thought it
necessary that such rights be found accruable or whether it was merely noting
accruability as support for its conclusion that "Ei]t is sufficient . . . that the
union's demands are not so plainly unreasonable that . . . the dispute must be
regarded as nonarbitrable because it can be seen in advance that no award to the
union could receive judicial sanction." Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
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question whether the grievance is subject to the arbitration
clause are preserved for the arbitrator. This view seems most
consistent with the standard of arbitrability enunciated by the
Supreme Court. If "[t]he function of the court is . . . confined
to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making
a claim which on its face is governed by the contract," " then
the arbitrator should be able to decide whether the grievance is
in fact encompassed by the arbitration provision.4 In setting
forth a low threshold for arbitrability, the Court emphasized
both the unique expertise of the arbitrator and the fundamental
difference between the arbitrator's mode of interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement and a court's interpretation of
contract language.40 If indeed it "is the arbitrator's construction
[of the agreement] which was bargained for," 17 then when the
agreement contains a broad arbitration clause, the courts should
preserve for the arbitrator all questions beyond the initial de-
termination that the duty to arbitrate is based on a valid
contract.48
Yet Judge Craven suggested that since the prior issue of
arbitrability had been determined by the court, only the merits
of the grievance were reserved for the arbitrator.49 It is difficult
to reconcile this view with either of the first two interpretations
of what he thought was required for a holding of arbitrability.50
If he considered sufficient either the mere claim that rights had
vested or a judicial determination that this claim was colorable,
then not only the merits but also the suitability of the claim for
arbitration should have been reserved for the arbitrator.5
Because neither of these two interpretations would require the
court to find definitively that the grievance was governed by the
" United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (ig6o).
See also United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581,
582-83 (I96O).
" See Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 6i
CALIF. L. REV. 663, 8oi (1973); Gregory, Enforcement of Collective Agreements
by Arbitration, 48 VA. L. REV. 883, 888 (1962) ; E. Jones, supra note 41, at 88i.
"United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-82
(ig6o).
" United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599
(ig6o). See also note 40 supra.
48 See Smith & D. Jones, supra note 29, at 782-88. See also Feller, supra note
45, at 8oo-oi (because arbitration is not merely alternative forum for adjudicating
contract claim, but is "performance of the only promise made [by an employer],"
premise of §uperior expertise of arbitrator is not necessary for rule that all griev-
ances purportedly based on contract should be referred to arbitration).
0oSee p. 815 supra.
so See id.
51 See p. 818 supra.
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agreement, Judge Craven's suggestion that only the merits remain
for the arbitrator seems to force the employer to proceed to the
merits of a dispute that the parties may not have intended to be
subject to arbitration.52 Under the third interpretation, a court
would be required to find that the grievance was governed by the
contract, which is consistent with the view that the only issue
for resolution in arbitration is final determination of the merits
of the dispute. 3 It is doubtful, however, that Judge Craven in-
tended this result 54 or that it is correct under the standard of
arbitrability established in the Steelworkers Trilogy.5
Because of the ambiguity of the opinions in Nolde, the court
was not successful in communicating to the arbitrator or to the
parties whether they had to proceed directly to the merits of the
severance pay dispute. But whatever issues remain open to the
arbitrator, the effect of the court's opinion is to require Nolde
Brothers to submit to arbitration a dispute that did not arise
until the union had terminated the collective bargaining agree-
ment 5 and the employer had ceased operations.17 The appro-
priateness of obligating the employer to arbitrate when the union
has no reciprocal obligation not to strike,58 and when the employ-
52 Criticism of Judge Craven for this apparent gap between what a court
should decide and what an arbitrator should decide may be unwarranted, for the
same ambiguity may be found in the Steelworkers Trilogy. While setting forth a
low threshold of arbitrability for the courts, the Supreme Court also asserted that
"the question of arbitrability is for the courts to decide," United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 583 n.7 (196o) ; see id. at 581-83.
5
' See p. 817 supra.
4 See note 36 supra.
"'See p. 819 supra.
" However, the agreement might as easily have been terminated by the em-
ployer, see p. 812 supra. If an employer were not bound to arbitrate severance
pay claims after termination, he could be expected to take advantage of such
termination power in anticipation of plant shutdown.
"' Since none of the opinions in Nolde relied on the short period between
termination of the agreement and shutdown of the plant, it is not clear what a
court would have done if the union had been decertified or had disappeared by
the time of plant shutdown. While the Supreme Court has held that an individual
employee may sue upon the agreement under § 301 (a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, see Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 37, U.S. r95 (1962), it has not
decided whether an individual has a right to arbitration in such a situation. Judge
Craven suggested that a court might itself decide the merits of a dispute when
arbitration is not "available," 78 Lab. Cas. at 20,196. At least one state court has
held that an employee has standing to sue for severance pay benefits under an ex-
pired agreement. Owens v. Press Publishing Co., 2o N.J. 537, 545-48, 12o A.2d 442,
446-48 (1956). While it has been argued that the only enforceable promise made
by an employer is to arbitrate with the union, see Feller, supra note 45, at 797,
8oi. The employer should be required to choose between arbitrating with the
employee or submitting to judicial resolution. Otherwise, the promise to arbitrate
becomes no promise at all when a union fortuitously disappears.
"8 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (0957)
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ment relationship itself has ended, is questionable. Arbitration
as a means of averting strikes and other forms of industrial
unrest r9 may serve no purpose in such a situation." Neverthe-
less, the supposed expertise of the arbitrator in determining what
the parties intended in the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement suggests that arbitration should be preferred to
judicial resolution, even after expiration and plant shutdown.
("Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an
agreement not to strike."). But see Feller, supra note 45, at 797-98 (arbitration
and no-strike provisions are not purely reciprocal promises).
" See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 58o
(ig6o).
"oHowever, if the union bargained for a broad arbitration clause in part be-
cause it believed this would require arbitration even after contract expiration,
then this obligation of the employer would have served a purpose in achieving a
collective agreement and thus in preventing industrial unrest while the agreement
remained in effect.
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